

The West Responds to the Arab Spring

Oded Eran

Introduction

The events of 2011 known as the “Arab spring” have the potential to generate a change in the Middle East on the scale of what occurred in Eastern Europe following the collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellite regimes. An optimistic outlook envisions a process that will preempt a Huntingtonian “clash of civilizations.”

The masses who attended demonstrations in the various Arab capitals in 2011 and in Tehran in 2009 made their disenchantment over human rights, political rights, regime transparency, and socio-economic hardships very clear. Fulfillment of their demands requires an ambitious multi-year agenda that depends on immense funding. Indeed, without the massive mobilization of international financial and economic institutions, the industrialized nations, and the oil and gas producing states (especially those in the Middle East), it is doubtful that it will be possible to leverage the Arab spring in an ongoing process to achieve a result similar to what exists today in Eastern Europe, more than two decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Unfortunately, the emergence of the Arab spring has coincided with ongoing economic and political crises in the two main blocs in the industrialized world – the United States and the European Union (which make up more than half of the G-8, the semi-official organization of the industrialized nations. Another country, Japan, is in distress following a natural disaster with serious economic ramifications.) In the United States, domestic criticism has increased over the fast and worrisome growth of the national debt. The threat of insolvency in Greece and perhaps in other countries in the Euro bloc has created one of the worst

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crises for the European Union since its creation. The need to make hundreds of billions of euros available to the countries in the greatest distress (110 billion euros for Greece alone in 2010) considerably reduces the ability of the European Union to allocate significant budgets for causes outside the EU member states. Not only has the euro crisis not been solved; it is expected to get worse.

Politically, domestically, and internationally, conditions on both sides of the Atlantic do not bode well for the US and the EU to mobilize the resources needed to translate the current situation in some of the Arab states into an historic revolutionary process. The United States is approaching the last quarter of President Obama's current term with the Republicans controlling the House of Representatives and threatening to prevent White House initiatives – especially in the realm of foreign policy – that require a significant appropriations budget. The European Union, in spite of the foreign service established by the Lisbon Treaty, has not succeeded in creating an effective framework, and it does not appear that the near future will bring a significant improvement and allow a key European institution in the realm of foreign and defense policy to forge a European policy with both vision and weight.

The Use of Force to Suppress Demonstrations

For decades the West¹ has tended to tolerate the sometimes violent suppression of human and political rights in most Arab countries. This leniency has generally been explained in that the various regimes are allies of the West, but this explanation is less than consistently applicable. The mass demonstrations, killings, and brutality toward Iranian demonstrators following the Iranian elections in 2009, for example, earned only weak verbal criticism from Europe and the United States. The more recent uprisings in the Arab states have led to different reactions by Europe and the United States in each case, and this variety conveys a message of double and triple standards, of interests overcoming morality, and of extreme action being taken against tyrannical regimes only when there is no economic and/or political cost for such action.

The fact that UN Security Council Resolution 1973, mandating the establishment of a no-fly zone in Libyan airspace, was adopted only after the Arab League gave the green light to such a resolution is perhaps understandable politically, but it is not morally persuasive. When

Resolution 1973 was passed on March 17, 2011, the number of those killed in Libya, according to most estimates, was not significantly higher than the number of those killed to date in Syrian cities. As of the writing of this article, there has been no uproar in the Arab League or the Security Council regarding events in Syria, and only well into the disturbances there did two permanent members, Britain and France, begin to work toward adopting a resolution on Syria that resembles the Libyan resolution. For their part, Russia and China have made it clear they will not approve such a resolution, since they believe that the situation in Syria does not constitute a danger to world peace. The G-8 final declaration from its May 2011 summit in Deauville, France notes only that “should the Syrian authorities not heed this call [to stop using violence], we will consider further measures.”² In his main speech thus far on the events in the Middle East,³ President Obama stated that the fear of a massacre in Libya and the existence of a mandate to act prompted the United States to cooperate with its NATO allies in the Libyan operation. He did not explain why in the case of Syria the US made do with sanctions only and a call for President Asad to step down, warning him about challenges from within Syria and isolation from without. To date no resolution has been adopted by the UNSC on Syria.

On the other hand, the United States and the European nations have almost entirely ignored the entry of Saudi forces into Bahrain to assist the regime in suppressing the demonstrations initiated mainly by the Shiites, who constitute a majority of the population.⁴ In Yemen too, where the struggle of the rebels against the regime of President Ali Abdullah Saleh has already claimed hundreds of victims, no military intervention has been considered thus far, and the international community remains on the sidelines.

The unconditional American support for President Mubarak’s swift removal will reverberate for a long time in the region, especially in the regimes that had assumed that the United States would not allow them to be overthrown. The United States’ prompt abandonment of Mubarak contributed, inter alia, to Saudi

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willingness to send forces to Bahrain and to the willingness of the Gulf Cooperation Council to consider adding two more Arab monarchies, Jordan and Morocco, to its ranks. The purpose is to strengthen the military capabilities of the Gulf states out of fear of the vacuum that may be created following the final American withdrawal from Iraq, and the increasing signs that the United States is reluctant to use force against Iran's ongoing nuclear military activity.

NATO's Operation Unified Protector has been underway for over three months, and Qaddafi's regime has stood firm. The mandate NATO set for itself does not stipulate that the goal is to topple the regime; however, since NATO accuses the regime of continuing to suppress the population, it is in effect admitting that the operation has not yet achieved its goal. The defense ministers of the NATO states decided at their June 8 meeting to extend the operation until the end of September 2011.⁵ After (as of June 21) more than 4,500 combat sorties, there is a kind of stalemate between regime forces and rebels, with each side maintaining its positions and NATO forces succeeding in transferring supplies and aid, mainly to the Benghazi area.

The fact that the West has not issued a single threat to use force against the regime in Damascus can of course be attributed to the lack of encouragement or a mandate from the Arab League, and following that, of a UN Security Council resolution. But even if these conditions existed, NATO would presumably find it difficult to agree to the use of force there. In late June, EU foreign ministers made do with a threat to expand the sanctions only to Syrian personalities and companies connected to the repressive measures. From this point of view, therefore, Libya is the exception to the rule, since it was not expected that there would be a "price" for military action – in the form of damage by Libya to essential interests of the United States and other NATO members – and indeed, thus far NATO forces have not suffered any loss of life or equipment.

Regional Socio-Economic Conditions

Even before the outbreak of the uprisings in the Arab world, the basic economic statistics in the region were among the worst in the world. Real economic growth in the region in the 1980s and 1990s was 3 percent, as opposed to 4.5 percent in emerging economies. Between 1980 and 2010, per capita GDP in the Middle East grew by only .5 percent, versus

3 percent in the developing economies.⁶ In the wake of recent events, the forecast for growth in 2011 has dropped dramatically, other than for oil and gas producing states in the Persian Gulf. The current forecast is for average growth of only 3.6 percent in the entire region in 2011, a decline of one third from the previous estimate.⁷ The decline can be explained by the reduction in income from tourism (in Egypt and Tunisia in 2010, the tourism sector accounted for 13 and 16 percent of the GDP, respectively); disruptions in ongoing economic activity; and the reduction in investments as a result of the increased political uncertainty and the expected growth in the budget deficit. As opposed to growth of 5.2 percent in Egypt in 2010, the forecast for 2011 is for only 1 percent. Growing inflationary pressures and a dramatic rise in the prices of imported food products will exacerbate the situation.⁸

In the short and medium term, the Arab spring incurs serious economic ramifications. The continuation of the uprising will only complicate the situation and the ability to cope with the political implications. Many sectors, such as construction, tourism, and the financial sector, are prone to long term damage. In the short term, temporary, interim governments and new governments are liable to prefer populist measures, such as subsidizing food products and raising wages in the public service sectors⁹ over raising taxes in order to reduce the budget deficit, and the overall picture is of an ongoing and deepening economic crisis.

The International Monetary Fund estimates that \$160 billion is required for 2011-13 to cope with the range of the problems of the oil importing states in the region,¹⁰ with the main goal being the establishment of maximum economic stability until even partial implementation of political, economic, and social reforms. For the international community, and especially for the United States, the European Union, and Japan, these needs are an almost impossible burden due to their respective internal situations of economic pressures.

The United States has thus far swapped \$1 billion of the Egyptian debt, on condition that the Egyptian government invest that amount in creating jobs, and it will guarantee another billion dollars in loans that Egypt raises in the global market. Likewise, the government agency Overseas Private Investment Corporation may grant up to \$2 billion of basic aid to the private sector in the region. In his meeting with King Abdullah of Jordan on May 17, President Obama agreed to provide Jordan

with \$1 billion, as well as 50,000 tons of wheat (some 5 percent of annual consumption, or close to \$17.5 million, in prices of May 2011).¹¹

Before the Deauville summit, the European Union decided to provide 1.24 billion euros to the states in the region, in addition to 5.7 billion euros in aid that was previously authorized.¹² At the summit, the leaders of the G-8 decided to make available through the international development banks – primarily the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which deals with Eastern European countries – more than \$20 billion for Tunisia and Egypt by 2013. Presumably this will be in the form of loans, since banks do not generally give grants. The government of France, the host of the summit, announced a grant of 185 million euros in budgetary aid for the Tunisian government, as well as 425 million euros for Tunisia’s economic rehabilitation. In addition, France has granted 650 million euros to Egypt for economic recovery.¹³

The amounts presented thus far are far from the annual amount that according to the International Monetary Fund is needed for the recovery of economies in the region, and hence the importance of the Arab oil and gas producing states in creating a life preserver and a lever for change. The paradox is that these states are being asked to assist a process that is not desirable from their point of view, and they face a dilemma whether to help or to appear as if they are abandoning Arab populations in distress.

From published reports on the subject, it appears that Saudi Arabia has provided Egypt with \$4 million in grants, “soft” loans, and deposits in Egyptian banks.¹⁴ In addition, the International Monetary Fund has placed \$3 billion at Egypt’s disposal for the next twelve months for aid in economic reconstruction and for creating jobs. The IMF also announced the Egyptian government’s intention to raise taxes on those with large incomes, to assist small and medium enterprises (SMEs), not to impose a value added tax, to eliminate subsidies, and to take further measures, even though the IMF believes, along with the Egyptian government, that at this stage it is not possible to implement all of the reforms.¹⁵

On May 24, the president of the World Bank announced the Bank’s willingness to provide \$6 billion in aid to Egypt and Tunisia.¹⁶ For its part, Saudi Arabia provided Jordan with \$400 million in cash in order to reduce the budget deficit that has increased significantly, mainly as a result of rising energy prices.¹⁷ In addition, it established a fund of \$20 billion to

stabilize Oman and Bahrain, with the overt intention to strengthen the Arab monarchies.¹⁸

Although these sums still do not approach what the IMF estimates is needed (more than \$50 billion per year for three years), they are proof of the willingness by the international community to mobilize for this task. On the other hand, the various modes through which the aid will be channeled and the lack of oversight mechanisms for some of the aid, such as the Saudi money, raise many questions concerning the effectiveness of the aid, especially on issues whether it will help create jobs or will be utilized in a manner more transparent than in the past. Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper raised these doubts when he declared at the G-8 summit that his country would not donate additional money or resources above and beyond its role in international financial institutions, as only they can monitor the appropriate use of the financial assistance.¹⁹ The funds from Saudi Arabia, some \$25 billion, most of which is being given as a grant and as a direct budgetary injection, are certainly not conditional on reforms. Hence, there should be no great expectations of a substantive change in the immediate term as a result of the Western-Arab aid to the Arab regimes in countries where the uprisings took place. The impact of the demonstrations will likely encourage, at least in the immediate term, regime transparency and less corruption and waste. Without closer monitoring than in the past by international institutions, however, it is highly doubtful whether the emergency aid will extend beyond a grace period.

The Long Term Western Approach

In the short term the international community has succeeded in raising significant sums of money, even if they do not yet reach the amounts required and there is no certainty that they will assist in promoting the goals of the hundreds of thousands of demonstrators in the Arab world – goals that are also shared by Western governments. In the long term, however, the West does not have a satisfactory answer. Whether the spark that ignited the uprisings in 2011 was an Iranian spark – the mass demonstrations against the regime during and following the 2009 elections – or whether it was a Tunisian citizen’s self-immolation in protest against the regime’s maltreatment, the common denominator among them is protest against the tyranny of the central government,

the suppression of individual rights and freedoms, and socio-economic decay. In a number of instances, the rebels succeeded in ousting the rulers, but above all it is clear that their great success was in creating a new basis for political discourse in the Middle East. This new discourse involves the citizens themselves, along with temporary central governments and post-elections governments in the various countries, and all sectors of civil society, including the media, which certainly drew encouragement and strength from the citizens' willingness to clash with their governments.

This situation sparks many questions, including: How is it possible to maintain the achievements of the Arab spring so that it does in fact generate change and guarantee reform for the long term? What is the relevance of past processes that are similar (at least externally), for example, in Eastern Europe and/or South America? What is the role of the Western states, beyond their financial support? Are the Arab states, particularly those that import energy, capable of bearing the burden of the debts? What is the connection between the need to create nearly 100 million jobs in the coming decade and the success of the political reforms? In light of the increasing dependence of the Far East economies on Middle East energy resources, is it possible to create three way economic interaction between the energy importing economies in the Middle East and the Far East, and the energy producing economies in the Middle East?

Thus far, the West's response is far from providing a clear answer to these and other questions. The United States, the European Union, and the international financial institutions were preoccupied with many of these questions, even before the start of the uprisings. Recent events have only accelerated the discussion and increased the pressure to find a strategic answer.

In his May 19 address on the Middle East, President Obama did not contribute a great deal to the discussion. He acknowledged that political issues were not the only catalyst that pushed the masses into the street, and that ultimately, the key point is concern for food and their families. The transition to democracy depends on the expansion of growth and wellbeing enjoyed by all. Yet beyond the immediate steps noted above, the US President did not provide inklings of long term solutions.

The US Secretary of the Treasury and Secretary of State were more concrete in their letter to their colleagues before the Deauville G-8

summit,²⁰ adopting the priorities of the masses of protestors as they understood them: financial stability; a strengthened private sector; reduced corruption; greater employment; and further integration of their markets with the regional and global economy. In addition, the United States proposed to its partners that they convert Egypt's debts into investments in the Egyptian economy, as it itself did. The United States also suggested that the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development be reoriented to Middle East development as well, and indeed, this recommendation was adopted by the G-8. Furthermore, noting that non-oil exports constitute less than one tenth of the total trade in the area, the US revisited the idea of increasing regional trade: "Just as membership in the European Union served as a powerful incentive for economic transformation in Central and Eastern Europe after the Cold War, so should the prospect of participating in an integrated and dynamic regional economy create a powerful force for reform in the Middle East and North Africa."²¹ This statement can only be interpreted as an invitation to the European Union to integrate the Arab states in the European Economic Area.

The European Union has in fact been deliberating the question of its relations with the Middle East and North Africa since the early 1990s. Among the considerations are the dependence of EU states on Middle Eastern sources of energy; the ramifications for Europe of the instability in the region due to its geographic proximity; the desire to play a role in the political process as a way of building the EU's political-security capability; and processes of illegal immigration from North Africa to Europe. Over the last three decades, the European Union has created three different frameworks in an attempt to address the question of its relations with the region: the Barcelona Process of 1995, the European Neighborhood Policy of 2004, and the Union for the Mediterranean of 2008. All these instruments were intended to provide a response to European priorities while blocking the possibility of full economic integration for the neighbors, not to mention full membership (even though a country such as Morocco has expressed interest in this). The EU has proposed establishing a Free Mediterranean Trade Area and association agreements that will also participation in certain European programs. On the other hand, it demanded that its Mediterranean

partners implement domestic economic, legal, and political reforms, and that their legislation be approximated to the European legislation.

The process of reconsidering EU policy vis-à-vis Europe's southeastern neighbors began even before the start of the Arab uprisings, but recent events have underlined the urgency of the review. On May 25, 2011, a joint communication was issued by the Directorate General for Enlargement of the European Commission and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Lady Catherine Ashton.²² The authors of the document acknowledge that thus far, the European Union has failed to achieve political reforms in neighboring countries, and because of recent events, a new approach is needed to strengthen the partnership between the EU and its neighbors. The principle that will guide the European Union, according to this document, is making European aid conditional on progress in building democracy and the rule of law. "The more and the faster a country progresses in its internal reforms, the more support it will get from the EU." The document's authors call this approach "more for more." With the European Union also apparently threatening to eliminate benefits in the event of regression and deterioration regarding human and political rights, the document is replete with encouraging formulations, such as "an ambitious response to the momentous changes currently ongoing in the Southern Mediterranean region," or "the partnership will be comprehensive and wide."

Nevertheless, the unavoidable conclusion from the document is that the frameworks and tools used by the European Union in its relations with neighboring countries have been refurbished, but not substantively changed. There is nothing wrong with a "more for more" approach, but this will not ensure the survival of the various reforms, even if they are adopted, and the growth of a responsible democratic leadership in the EU's Arab neighbors. The European model is not perfect and it has not entirely prevented corruption or economic failures, but it has enormously improved the situation that existed in some of the member states before they joined. For reforms in Arab countries to be adopted and maintained for the longer term, the said Arab states should adopt European-like legislation in the relevant domains. The incentives to do so and the desire to meet European standards will come from the series of economic measures that the European Union is proposing in this document.

However, the most important incentives, which do not appear in the document, are the European willingness to take risks and show a new kind of openness. Agriculture, for example, is still important in the economy of the neighboring countries. Although in the long term Middle East states must find alternatives to this sector, in the short and middle term the European Union must show greater willingness to absorb agricultural produce from these states. A no less fundamental change would be encouragement to adopt European legislation and conduct according to European standards, by integrating the various states in the European process of drafting legislation – although not in the decision on legislation (decision shaping vs. decision making) – in areas where the EU and a neighboring country have decided to cooperate. Including senior officials and even ministers from the neighboring states in internal European processes will increase their willingness to act according to higher standards. This also applies to including parliaments of the neighboring countries in legislative processes in the European parliament. In this way, a sense of joint ownership will be created, and feelings of coercion and European diktats that the authors of the May 25 European document wish to avoid will be eliminated.

The financial aid to states where the struggle for change and reform is underway cannot at this point come from Europe. It must be channeled mainly by the international financial institutions so that the aid will be utilized in the most transparent and effective manner. On the other hand, the EU countries have a central role to play in shaping the new regimes, given their promise to satisfy the expectations of those who sacrificed their lives in the streets of Tripoli, Cairo, and Damascus. In order to fulfill this task, the European Union must resolve dilemmas such as the contradiction between the desire to help and the interests of states or pressure groups within the European Union, or the ability to break out of the traditional – at times rigid – EU frameworks.²³

On the one hand, the G-8 document on the Arab spring²⁴ echoes the key points that appeared in the European Union’s document and in the letter from the US Secretary of State and Secretary of the Treasury to their colleagues. On the other hand, it is a promise by the leading countries of the world economy and is

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backed up by the leading financial institutions. The process has only just begun and as President Obama stated in his May 19 speech, it will continue for a long time. Both the Arab oil and gas producing states, besides Saudi Arabia, and the European Union will have more than enough time to achieve what the concluding document of the G-8 calls “a strategic shift in the approach and actions of the international community.”

The Dialogue with the Rebel Political Forces

Both the United States and the European Union have in the past held contacts with opposition members in Arab countries. The uprisings in Arab countries in the first half of 2011 have provided international authorization for open contacts with rebel forces, such as in Libya, for example. The International Contact Group, a group of states in contact with the Transitional National Council that was established in late February 2011, meets frequently and sees this Council as “the legitimate interlocutor for the Libyan people.”²⁵ These states provide it with financial aid, and even purchase oil produced in the region under the control of the rebel forces in Libya. A no less interesting phenomenon is the decision by Arab oil producing states to aid the Transitional Council. The process concerning Libya, which began with an Arab League decision and continued with Security Council resolution 1973, thus moved to a new stage when Kuwait and Qatar transferred \$180 million and \$100 million, respectively, to the Libyan Transitional Council. The International Contact Group also discussed the situation in Yemen at its third meeting, in June in Abu Dhabi.

The Arab spring has created a precedent, albeit vague, of cooperation between Western states and Arab states against Arab regimes. It can of course be argued that less important states in the Arab League like Libya and Yemen should not be considered a precedent for situations elsewhere, in Syria, for example. On the other hand, Arab states are lending a hand to removing rulers against the backdrop of internal problems (unlike in 1990-91, when they cooperated with the United States in the Gulf War in the wake of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait). This cooperation is certainly not based on shared values, since the regime in Kuwait, for example, is not identified as a democratic regime, rather on converging interests. Herein perhaps lies weakness in the cooperation and the reason for its transience. An interesting test in this context will be the desire and the

ability of the Western and Arab partners – similar to their collaboration on Libya – to reach out to the rebels in Syria, or work together on Bahrain, where clear US interests are manifest in the form of a huge military base.

Notes

- 1 For lack of a better term, the “West” here describes the bloc of states on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean.
- 2 G-8 Declaration, “Renewed Commitment for Freedom and Democracy,” May 26-27, 2011, <http://www.g20-g8.com/g8-g20/g8/english/the-2011-summit/declarations-and-reports/declarations/renewed-commitment-for-freedom-and-democracy.1314.html>.
- 3 President Obama’s speech of May 19, 2011, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/19/remarks-president-middle-east-and-north-africa>.
- 4 In his May 19 speech, President Obama expressed understanding for Bahrain’s need to protect itself from Iranian subversion, but he criticized it for attacking civil rights and the legitimate call for reforms.
- 5 “NATO and Partners Will Stay the Course on Libya,” NATO website, June 8, 2011, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_75194.htm?. The site provides detailed data on the types of naval and aerial activity and humanitarian assistance.
- 6 International Monetary Fund report submitted to the G-8 summit on May 27, 2011, *Economic Transformation in MENA: Delivering on the Promise of Shared Prosperity*, <http://www.imf.org/external/np/g8/pdf/052711.pdf>.
- 7 World Bank Middle East and North Africa Region Regional Economic Update, May 2011, *MENA Facing Challenges and Opportunities*, http://sitere-sources.worldbank.org/MENAEXT/Resources/EDP_MNA_2011.pdf.
- 8 In Egypt, the forecast is for a deficit of 9 percent in 2011-12, and in Jordan, 6.2 percent and 5.2 percent, respectively, for these years. See *ibid*.
- 9 At least seven Arab governments have done this recently. Nine governments have raised subsidies on basic products. See *ibid*.
- 10 International Monetary Fund report submitted to the G-8 summit on May 27, 2011, *Economic Transformation in MENA: Delivering on the Promise of Shared Prosperity*, <http://www.imf.org/external/np/g8/pdf/052711.pdf>. This sum is divided equally among the three years included in the assessment, that is, more than \$50 billion per year.
- 11 White House announcement of May 18, 2011, “Factsheet: Economic Support for the Middle East and North Africa,” <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/18/factsheet-economic-support-middle-east-and-north-africa>.
- 12 “A New and Ambitious European Neighbourhood Policy,” May 25, 2011, <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/643>.
- 13 The French President’s announcement as an appendix to the G-8 closing statement of May 27, 2011, “The ‘Deauville Partnership’: Helping the Arab

- Countries in Their Transition to Free and Democratic Societies,” <http://www.g20-g8.com/g8-g20/g8/english/live/news/the-deauville-partnership-helping-the.1323.html>.
- 14 Middle East News, announcement by Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, head of the temporary Egyptian council, May 24, 2011.
 - 15 IMF press release 11/216 of June 5, 2011, <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2011/pr11216.htm>. The announcement implies that the IMF aid is part of this amount.
 - 16 World Bank press release 2011/500/EXT, May 24, 2011, <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:22922288~pagePK:64257043~piPK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html>.
 - 17 Reuters, June 3, 2011.
 - 18 Prince Waleed bin Talal al-Saud to the *New York Times*, Neil MacFarquhar, “Saudi Arabia Scrambles to Limit Region’s Upheaval,” May 27, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/28/world/middleeast/28saudi.html?_r=2.
 - 19 See Prime Minister Harper’s comments to CBC News, May 27, 2011.
 - 20 Secretary Clinton and Secretary Geithner Joint Letter to G-8 Ministers, Media Note, Office of the Spokesman, May 25, 2011, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/05/164252.htm>.
 - 21 Ibid.
 - 22 European Commission High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, COM(2011) 303, May 25, 2011, *Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood*, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com_11_303_en.pdf. A short version is also available, MEMO/11/342, May 25, 2011, *A New and Ambitious European Neighbourhood Policy*, <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/11/342&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>.
 - 23 See the article by Katarzyna Peiczyska-Naicz, “Democratisation in the Neighbourhood: Noble Declarations and Unavoidable Dilemmas,” *EurActiv*, May 20, 2011, <http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/democratisation-neighbourhood-noble-declarations-unavoidable-dilemmas-analysis-505000>.
 - 24 G-8 Information Centre, “Declaration of the G-8 on the Arab Spring,” May 26-27, 2011, <http://www.g20-g8.com/g8-g20/g8/english/live/news/declaration-of-the-g8-on-the-arab-springs.1316.html>.
 - 25 Comments by Secretary of State Clinton, “Press Availability in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates,” June 9, 2011, <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/06/165351.htm>.