

## Chapter 8

# ***The Civilian Front in the Second Lebanon War***

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### **Introduction**

The Second Lebanon War was waged simultaneously on two fronts: the military front in southern Lebanon, where IDF forces fought in Hizbollah strongholds, and the civilian fronts deep inside Lebanon and Israel, where civilians served as combat targets for both sides. This represented a new height in the trend that has been emerging for some time, whereby the focus of the fighting in the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict transfers from a direct clash between armed forces to a mixed pattern, in which the role of civilians on both sides is increasingly central. The assumption underlying this trend is that in an asymmetrical war, in which one of the sides is militarily inferior to the other, striking against the civilian front has a major impact on the balance of power. The fact that this approach was embraced by the weak, in this case Hizbollah, is self-understood. Having no chance of defeating the clearly stronger side, it could only turn to exerting pressure on the civilian front, the one that has been perceived as the weak link. Interestingly, the stronger side too, in this case Israel, has followed suit, suggesting that military pressure on civilian targets is accepted as an important strategic lever.

It seems that both sides' assumptions regarding the benefits of using military means against civilian populations and infrastructures are questionable.<sup>1</sup> The heavy damage inflicted by Israel on the Lebanese home front did not bring the Lebanese citizens, and certainly not the Shiites, to sever their ties to Hizbollah, nor did the massive strikes against Israel's home front bear out Nasrallah's "spider web" theory. Israeli society did

not collapse under the barrage of rockets that fell daily on the towns and villages in the north of Israel.

This essay will look at the Israeli aspect of the civilian front and will focus on two main questions: (a) how did Israeli society withstand the ongoing intense Hizbollah attacks during the war? To what degree did Israeli society display resilience, and what enabled it to withstand the blows as it did? (b) To what extent was the home front prepared to deal with the difficult experience of the Hizbollah rocket barrages, and in particular, what lessons should be learned from the experience of July-August 2006, assuming that in the future Israel's enemies – in the first, second, and third circles – might well opt for short or long range, conventional or non-conventional rockets or missiles against the home front as a preferred target.

### **The Resilience of Israel's Home Front**

During the thirty-three days of fighting, Hizbollah fired nearly 4,000 rockets (an average of 120 a day) towards population centers in northern Israel. While only 901 – less than a quarter – hit populated areas, they achieved substantive results: thirty-nine civilians were killed; thousands were injured, most (about 2,200) suffering from shock and anxiety and about 100 suffering from severe or medium-level injuries; and some 12,000 buildings were damaged, most suffering limited damage. These figures show only part of the picture. One can add the hundreds of thousands of people who left their homes for all or part of the war, under very difficult conditions, the emotional distress experienced by people in the north because of the sirens, rocket landings, and actual strikes,<sup>2</sup> the financial damage sustained by individuals and businesses, and the overall economic burden to the country, estimated at approximately NIS 30 billion.<sup>3</sup>

The configuration of Hizbollah's force buildup, with the massive support from Syria and Iran, reflected the true perception of the organization and its leaders. They understood that they could not stand up to the Israeli war machine in a direct, all-out confrontation. Rather, extensive and continuous strikes on the home front would possibly achieve the strategic balance by upsetting the social fabric in Israel. This was designed to exert political pressure on the government, which in turn might diminish its determination to confront the enemy in military and political terms. Supporting evidence

of this approach can be found in Nasrallah's speech of May 26, 2000, following Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon, in which he described Israeli society to be as flimsy as a "spider web."<sup>4</sup> In other words, it was perceived to be far weaker than it looked, and hence, heavy strikes against it would perhaps yield the desired balance.

Is this really the case? The answer is not clear and depends on the point of view, be it Israel's or Hizbollah's. One may assume that Hizbollah emerged from the war with a positive view of the results, even if it did not fully realize its expectations. On the Israeli side, the question of national resilience, or the robustness of the Israeli public, is a complex issue that is difficult to assess.<sup>5</sup> The notion of national resilience is based on a set of concepts taken from the discipline of psychology, which examine reactions of the individual, the community, and society as a whole to traumatic events. A major criterion would be the degree and speed that normal life resumes following a trauma. The assumption is that the more resilient individual, community, or public will respond significantly to the severity of the traumatic events, but will return to its normal pattern of life within a short space of time. Alternately, a low level of resilience may be defined in cases whereby the group, community, or entire society reacts in an extreme manner to traumatic challenges and finds it hard to return to routine life even after a considerable period of time.

The Israeli public associates national resilience with other values, such as the extent of cohesiveness and solidarity of society; the consensus regarding the main issues at a given time; the degree of support for the government and its policies, particularly during a time of crisis; support for national symbols, such as the IDF; and the way the Israeli economy functions.

The overall picture that emerges with regard to the resilience of the home front during the war is mixed. On the one hand, the most distinct dimension was the fact that many civilians left their homes for all or most of the war. Figures on the extent of the phenomenon, though incomplete and not reliable, indicate that around 120,000 of about 200,000 residents living close to the confrontation line left their homes,<sup>6</sup> about 17,000 of the 24,000 inhabitants of Kiryat Shmona evacuated their town,<sup>7</sup> and a similar proportion left other urban centers. Even if in fact the figures were lower, as suggested by a survey published on September 20,<sup>8</sup> it is still clear that

there was a widespread pattern reflecting the war's impact on the home front. Two observations are relevant here:

- The traditional Israeli view considered civilians who left their homes as “deserters” reflecting a fundamentally negative approach, namely, a lack of roots and possibly even non-compliance with national expectations. Over the years the traditional perception has faded and been replaced, at least in part, by the recognition that leaving is a normal reaction, an appropriate, reasonable response to genuine threats in a time of distress. Shlomo Breznitz clearly expressed the current approach by saying that “one must be very careful when saying that people must not evacuate...I don't consider this running away. If someone lives in a region that is under threat...that is one of most rational courses of action. There should not be any social sanction associated with it. It should not be criticized. On the contrary, it should be encouraged.”<sup>9</sup>
- Most of those who left their homes did so on their own initiative and at their own expense. The state – intentionally – did not act in this regard until the end of the war. This was a very sensitive issue from the outset, both in domestic political terms and in terms of the projected national image as viewed by the enemy. According to the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense subcommittee on the home front,<sup>10</sup> no evacuation procedure – such as approved by the government in November 2001, whereby civilians are to be evacuated when “damage is inflicted on civilians by a missile attack” – was implemented. It was only on August 7 that a limited “refreshing” plan was put together by the prime minister's office for some of those living in bomb shelters in northern settlements. This was a short term evacuation of several tens of thousands of residents, with generous assistance from NGOs. The message was clear: the government avoided setting a policy on this complex matter, and in fact left the decision to the citizens and the implementation to NGOs.

Residents of the north returned to their homes as soon as the rocket fire ended and resumed their normal daily routine.<sup>11</sup> A considerable number of evacuees returned to work already during the war, even when absence was permitted (and paid for). A fortnight after the end of the hostilities the school year started as usual, including at all thirty-four schools that sustained damage. Prior to the autumn Jewish holiday season, six weeks

after the end of the war, internal tourism in the north had largely recovered. This distinct phenomenon of full and rapid resumption of normal life, particularly by the residents of the north, indicates a high degree of public resilience. This is supported by other evidence of normalization, including the limited willingness of the public to be involved in political protest against the government. This might suggest that for most Israelis, once the war ended it was time to get back to normal life, sooner rather than later.

The resilience of Israeli society at the time was also reflected by public opinion polls during the war. Full analysis is addressed by Yehuda Ben Meir in his article in this collection of essays; the picture is summarized in table 1.

**Table 1.** Public Opinion during and after the War

Date	Survey by	War justified	Satisfied with the prime minister	Satisfied with the defense minister	Satisfied with the IDF	Rely on the IDF	Public Mood
July 6	<i>Maariv</i>		43%	28%			
July 18	<i>Yediot</i>	86%	78%	72%	87%		
July 19	<i>Maariv</i>		78%	61%			
July 25	<i>Maariv</i>	95%	77%	60%			
July 28	<i>Yediot</i>	82%	74%	64%	80%		
August 1	Tami Steinmetz	93%			87%		2/3 good, 1/3 not good
August 3	<i>Globes</i>		71%	62%			65% feel secure
August 11	<i>Yediot</i>		66%	59%	48%	90%	55% not good, 45% good
August 11	<i>Haaretz</i>		48%	37%	59%		
August 16	<i>Maariv</i>		40%	28%		81%	
August 16	<i>Yediot</i>		47%	36%	61%	94%	
August 25	<i>Yediot</i>		26%	20%			
September 21	<i>Haaretz</i>		22%	14%			

A number of conclusions can be drawn from the figures:

- Throughout the war, almost until the very end, the Israeli public voiced its opinion, in consistently high percentages, that the war against Hizbollah was justified. According to the findings of a survey carried out at the end of July by the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research at Tel Aviv University, a few weeks into the war only 5 percent of those asked felt the war was unjustified. Ninety-one percent justified the air force attacks on Lebanon, even if they inflicted damage on civilian infrastructures and suffering on the civilian population there.<sup>12</sup>
- The degree of consensus is connected to the relatively high level of national resilience as perceived by the public. A survey conducted by the Tami Steinmetz Center in the third week of the war indicated that 88 percent of the respondents thought that Israeli society was withstanding the burden of the war well or very well, and only 9 percent considered the resilience as poor or very poor. Fifty-five percent estimated the national mood at the time of the survey as good or very good, compared with 41 percent who said it was bad or very bad. Those conducting the survey noted that from the beginning of the war, there was a significant rise in national morale.
- While the fighting continued, most of the Israeli public demonstrated a high level of support for the government and the IDF, compared with the period before the war. Towards the end of the war and particularly once it ended, there was a clear change in public opinion and a sharp downturn in support and satisfaction with the political and military leaderships. A survey conducted by the Dahaf Institute in mid-November 2006 and published in *Yediot Ahronot* found that 71 percent of those asked felt that the chief of staff should resign (compared with 55 percent who were of this opinion in late September) and 72 percent felt similarly about the minister of defense.
- Despite the decline in political support, including the clear drop in support for the chief of staff, the public maintained confidence in the IDF, notwithstanding very severe criticism of the army's performance, including from within the army. This discrepancy was also demonstrated in a Dahaf Institute survey whose results were published in *Yediot Ahronot* on August 16, immediately after the end of the war, according to which 94 percent (!) of the public felt that the IDF soldiers and

their commanders had conducted themselves well during the fighting. A follow-up survey conducted by the Tami Steinmetz Center in early September indicates a significant decline in the public's estimation of the IDF's performance. On a scale of 1-100 the IDF received a rating of 63, compared with 81 in 2001, although this is still far higher than the rating of the Supreme Court (48) and the Israeli government (28). According to the Dahaf survey from November, 78 percent of interviewees "rely on the army to protect Israel," compared with 22 percent who "do not rely" on the IDF. These figures reveal once again the unique position enjoyed by the IDF in Israeli society and the supportive feelings of the public, even when harsh criticism is expressed against it. Despite the operational failures during the war the IDF remained a valued national symbol.

- Most of the indexes indicate only small discrepancies between the response of residents of the north of Israel and those living in other parts of the country.

These figures shed light on Israeli's national resilience during the war. They indicate wide agreement on the objectives of the war and significant backing for the political leadership. This consensus is also indicated by the public's willingness to suffer the rocket attacks and sustain the fighting throughout the period. It explains the high response of reserve soldiers to mobilization orders. The fact that this consensus declined towards the end of the war and practically vanished after the war can reflect the rapid resumption of normal life and the familiar and generally divisive debates in Israeli society, and the public's progressing from a sense of obligation to the collective notions in times of need.

What are the possible explanations of this public rallying and strength during the war?<sup>13</sup> First, it is possible that the public understood at an early stage that indeed there was a real threat that must be addressed, but that it was rather limited in terms of the damage it could inflict. The perception of the war as justified is a central factor. The fact that Hizbollah took the first step and kidnapped two soldiers, which hit a raw Israeli nerve (shortly after the kidnapping of the soldier Gilad Shalit on the Gaza border), and then targeted civilians in its attacks, helped to portray it clearly as a terror organization, an active member of the "axis of evil," which can only be obstructed by standing firm against it.

These explanations prompt the basic assumption that national resilience to external threats is a permanent characteristic of Israeli society. Contrary to the claims of many, Israeli society is capable of absorbing heavy blows by its enemies. Perhaps it is not taken for granted as much now as it was in the past, when Israeli society was thought to be ready to rally round for the sake of the collective. However, this attribute is still an important element of strength and reflects a high degree of balanced normalcy, much of which is the ability to address threats in the right proportions, not always necessarily as existential threats in any challenge that emerges.<sup>14</sup>

These encouraging attributes of national resilience do not eclipse the severe social problems that came to light during the 2006 war. It highlighted deep divisions and serious problems that have existed in Israeli society for some time. Particularly prominent are the feelings of estrangement, coupled with the severe social and economic gaps that exist between the center of the country and the periphery,<sup>15</sup> between disadvantaged groups and those who are better off, and between Jews and Arabs (despite the assumption, which was largely dispelled, that as Hizbollah missiles do not differentiate between Jews and Arabs, there are grounds to expect unity in the face of a common enemy).<sup>16</sup> There is nothing new here, nor was there any exacerbation of these issues during or following the war. The war did not change much, if at all, and probably will not change these familiar features of Israeli society.

### **Deployment of the Home Front**

If the picture of Israeli national resilience during the war indicates a degree of optimism, the picture that emerges of home front preparedness is disappointing, particularly the performance of the government agencies. Many have defined it in harsh terms of neglect and abandonment; or to borrow from the imagery of the state comptroller, an eclipse of governmental function.<sup>17</sup>

The essence of the problem lies with the question of responsibility for the civilian front in time of war. In Israel there is no state entity with the responsibility to lead, integrate, coordinate, set long term policy, and build the required systems for the home front. There is no one body to define priorities and allocate funds, ensure implementation, and generate and



supervise the required changes according to the evolving circumstances. The legislature seemingly took care of this matter in the 1951 Civilian Protection Law that set “the means necessary to withstand any attack... on the civilian population.” The law established “the Civilian Defense, which was supposed to organize and manage the civilian home front... [and] coordinate the actions of the government ministries, the local authorities, and private facilities.”<sup>18</sup> The Home Front Command, which was established in February 1992 following the 1991 Gulf War, legally assumed those responsibilities. However, the scope of responsibility and areas of operation granted to the Civilian Defense in the early 1950s are no longer relevant. In the 2006 war the issues at hand were far more complex and sensitive: it was necessary to care for hundreds of thousands of civilians who left their homes; to tend to those who stayed behind and spent weeks in dilapidated bomb shelters; to supply food and health, psychological, and social services; to furnish reliable timely information; and to provide many other necessary services required by civilians in stress. These are difficult issues with social and economic ramifications and to a great extent moral, ethical, and political implications. The Home Front Command, as a branch of the IDF, cannot and should not be responsible for these overwhelming tasks.

As opposed to the clear definitions of the responsibilities of the IDF for defense of the state against the enemy, the responsibilities for the Civilian Defense in the wider sense is not defined at all. In addition to the Israeli police force (which in accordance with a government decision from 1974 is responsible for internal security) and the IDF’s Home Front Command, government ministries (Welfare, Health, Education, Finance, and Internal Security) also function, each in its own field, along with many other organizations, such as Magen David Adom (the Israeli Red Cross), the fire departments, the Emergency Economy system (“Melah”),<sup>19</sup> and the municipalities. The local authorities, at least the stronger among them, have in recent years gradually assumed more responsibility for the wellbeing of their residents, including in emergency situations.<sup>20</sup> The performance and success of the municipal authorities during the war was highly variable and depended on their strength, efficiency, and leadership. This caused major discrepancies between stronger and weaker municipalities.<sup>21</sup> In some cases the government intervened directly by appointing senior

representatives to run the local authorities. However, this was far from sufficient to cover population needs, particularly in towns where large numbers of disadvantaged civilians or people with special needs stayed behind. Concomitantly, public NGOs and numerous philanthropic organizations worked tirelessly. As a result, in any given area there were numerous official – state and municipal – organizations working alongside unofficial bodies, often without adequate coordination between them, to produce highly variable results.

The issue of responsibility is not an isolated one. It reflects the deep-rooted and long-established defense concept in Israel, which is military and offensive in nature, and assigns to the IDF the nearly exclusive role in confrontations with the enemy. The basic assumption has been that due to its small size and the concentration of its population in limited areas, Israel, in all scenarios and as quickly as possible, should transfer the combat area to enemy territory. The offensive approach was consistently viewed as the basis of defense. The problem with this one-dimensional approach was exposed in the Second Lebanon War.<sup>22</sup> To be sure, this was not the first time the home front was exposed to continuous attacks: in the War of Independence, the 1991 Gulf War, and the second intifada the civilian front constituted a major target. However, in 2006 the scope, persistence, and damage of the attacks were unprecedented. The assumption is that such a scenario might well materialize in future conflicts, possibly even to a greater degree.

As such, protecting the home front requires reexamination of the basic assumptions and priorities of Israel's national security concept. Defense of the home front, in all its aspects, must constitute a central component of the defense doctrine, with all that this entails in terms of the necessary investment and deployment. This does not just refer to technological solutions, such as defense systems against rockets and missiles. Assuming there is no comprehensive defense against high trajectory weapons launched in a concentrated manner and over time, an updated approach and deployment of the national systems dealing with the civilian population is essential.

It has been suggested that the conduct of the government during the war was also a product of the philosophy that the government should intervene less in its citizens' affairs and should allow public and private organizations

to take its place. Indeed, the weakening of the welfare state concept and practice in Israel and the privatization of public services, prevalent in education, welfare, health, and other sectors, was largely applied to the civilian front in time of war. In essence, the government abdicated, and encouraged the non-profit and charity organizations to take its place.<sup>23</sup> This philanthropic activity generated widespread solidarity among the Israeli public with the residents of the north. However, looking at this issue in a wider perspective, there are grounds to question the huge role of the NGOs vis-à-vis the problematic involvement of the state systems.

Another possible reason for the disappointing picture that emerged in relation to the system's handling of the civilian front stems from the fact that from the outset policymakers were not sure whether there was, in fact, a war that would persist for over a month.<sup>24</sup> For Israel, the confrontation began as a response to the kidnapping of the soldiers and developed in an unplanned fashion.<sup>25</sup> The government did not declare a state of war, with the ensuing legal, practical, and budgetary aspects, and sufficed with declaring "a special home front situation" in the north. One of the practical ramifications was that the Emergency Economy system was not activated, despite the fact that together with the Absorption and Deceased Authority ("Pesah") it is designed to deal with problems arising from an emergency situation.<sup>26</sup> The decision not to activate it reflects the decision makers' passive state of mind with regard to deployment of the home front.

The conclusion to be drawn from this is clear: the civilian front in the north and those charged with protecting it and addressing its needs were not prepared or ready for the war. However, the situation that emerged should not have come as a surprise. A special report issued by the state comptroller in 2001, which extensively reviewed the components of the civilian front in the north, concluded: "The settlements on the 'confrontation line' are not sufficiently protected in accordance with their needs."<sup>27</sup> Very little was done to correct the situation in the six years that followed this critique.

## **Conclusion**

The two primary issues addressed in this essay are closely intertwined. National resilience is a central factor in the ability of Israeli society to withstand the challenges that confront it in time of war. National resilience

is contingent on the public's sense that its government is doing what it possibly can to provide it with a reasonable level of individual security and responds appropriately to its needs in emergency situations. In the Second Lebanon War the Israeli public demonstrated reasonable capacity to stand up to the Hizbollah attack, despite the failure of the central and local governments to attend to the needs of the civil population during the war. There is no guarantee that this will occur in the future. Therefore, a new approach must be adopted vis-à-vis civilian security as an integral part of Israel's defense doctrine.<sup>28</sup> The assumption must be that Israel's enemies, the Palestinians, Arab states, and Iran, presently possess and will in the future acquire more advanced military means that will pose a considerable threat to the Israeli home front. In any confrontation in the future it is reasonable to assume that the civilian population will be a preferred target for inflicting ongoing, continuous, and extensive damage. Compared with the current situation, in which the depth of the civilian home front was limited primarily to Haifa and northwards, in the future it is possible that all centers of population, or many of them, will simultaneously be within striking range of rockets or missiles. In such a situation, people whose towns or villages are threatened will not have anywhere to go. Without a significant change in civilian defense and deployment of the home front, the next round may generate far more difficult situations than those of the last confrontation. In such circumstances there will be special importance attached to more than just protection of civilians' lives or property. The question of national resilience and the ability of the Israeli public to withstand the traumas over time will be far more acute and might have serious strategic implications. This scenario requires an entirely different approach and deployment, one that will generate a reasonable military defense system against rockets and missiles, and will considerably upgrade the system of public bomb shelters and provide a suitable response to the needs of the individual, the community, and the public. The lack of suitable preparation may have a considerable detrimental effect on the Israeli public's robustness during an all-out protracted attack on the home front.

Within the framework of an updated concept it is imperative that a national system be established for the defense of the home front. Several points are in order here:

- The “National Authority for the Home Front” must be established sooner than later. It cannot and should not be a part of the Ministry of Defense (as was recently decided) or the IDF. It should be civilian in nature, and its responsibilities and status should be determined by legislation. It should be responsible for strategic and operative planning, for formulating a civilian defense concept, for setting standards and implementing them over time through the different agencies, and for supervision, allocations, and coordination.
- The operational aspects of the system should be carried out by the local authorities. Some are capable and already prepared for this responsibility. Others will be able to prepare themselves, certainly if they are given a proper framework and if the appropriate funding is provided. There are many municipalities that require direct and extensive help, possibly over a length of time. There is no way this can be avoided, despite the expected difficulties. There is no genuine alternative to the municipal system as a means of providing the civilian population with the needed help in time of war.
- The NGOs should also play an important role in caring for civilian needs in situations of distress and emergencies. They should be incorporated into the systems at the municipal level in advance, in accordance with the policies and standards determined by the government. However, the guiding line must be that the state and the local authorities have the responsibility and authority, while the NGOs should act as supportive elements.

Israel’s ability to improvise will be a major characteristic in future confrontations as well. However, improvisation by itself cannot suffice to provide suitable solutions for the huge challenges that the home front will confront. A full system-wide solution is required in order to limit the expected risks and to provide the civilians with the means to keep up their resilience in times of war.

## Notes

1. Lt. Col. Nurit, “Enforcement from the Air – The Lessons of History,” *Maarachot* 408 (August 2006).
2. According to figures compiled by Prof. Mooli Lahad from Tel Hai Academic College and quoted in *Yediot Ahronot* on August 16, 2006, 16,000 children – 35 percent

of those who stayed in the north during the attacks – suffered from difficulties in concentration, nightmares, and increased bouts of crying. About 6,000 children continued to experience severe anxieties following the war. In July 2006, NATAL (an NGO that deals with victims of trauma) received around 5,000 telephone calls for help, double the number of calls received throughout the previous year (*Haaretz*, August 14, 2006). See also a special report by Yitzhak Gilat on initial findings on calls to ERAN (Emotional First Aid by Telephone) during the war in Lebanon, published on the association’s website, [www.eran.org.il](http://www.eran.org.il).

3. Sever Plotzker, *Yediot Ahronot*, August 24, 2006, quotes Dr. Yaakov Sheinin who estimated the production loss during the war at around NIS 9 billion, the damage to tourism from abroad at close to NIS 6 billion, damage caused to property in the north at some NIS 8 billion, and direct military costs during the war at approximately NIS 7 billion. This, he said, represents a loss of 2 percent growth over two years. According to *The Marker*, August 22, 2006, the Ministry of Finance estimated direct and indirect damage to the home front during the war at around NIS 6 billion, including a transfer of NIS 2 billion to the defense budget and another NIS 3 billion that was allocated to local authorities and government ministries during the war.
4. The exact quotation is, “Our brothers in Palestine: I want to tell you in God’s name that Israel, which has nuclear weapons and the strongest air force in the region, is as weak as a spider web.”
5. The issue of national resilience – its definitions and pertinent methodologies – has been examined in a number of papers and publications. See, for example, Meir Elran, *Israel’s National Resilience: The Influence of the Second Intifada on Israeli Society*, Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Memorandum no. 81, January 2006.
6. See the briefing by the director general of the prime minister’s office, *Haaretz*, August 10, 2006.
7. *Yediot Ahronot*, August 9, 2006. See also the article by Daniel Ben Simon, *Haaretz*, August 11, 2006, in which he claims that Kiryat Shmona had never experienced an evacuation on such a scale, even during previous clashes.
8. A survey conducted by the Taub Center for Social Policy Studies in Israel, published in several publications, including *The Marker* on September 20, 2006, indicates that 85 percent of male residents of the north did not leave their homes and 9 percent left for only a few days. About 66 percent of the women did not leave and 13 percent left for a short period. Around 90 percent of Arab inhabitants did not leave their towns and villages, compared with 66 percent of Jewish residents. There were also differences in levels of income: 77 percent of those who reported having a low income stayed in their towns, compared with 60 percent of residents with high incomes.
9. Interview with Shahar Ilan, *Haaretz*, July 20, 2006. Prof. Breznitz is a psychologist who specializes in stress situations and is also a member of Knesset.
10. *Yediot Ahronot*, August 22, 2006.
11. According to *Yediot Ahronot*, August 22, 2006, retail commerce resumed in full throughout the country two days after the ceasefire. The credit card business turnover

- on August 16 was 8 percent higher than before the war. There was also a 42 percent increase in shopping in the north in the days after the war.
12. Surveys of Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research at Tel Aviv University, July-August 2006. See full details in *Haaretz*, August 9 and September 12, 2006, and on the Center's website.
  13. See article by Prof. Baruch Nevo, dean of the Safed Academic College, "We Stood Up Well," *Haaretz*, August 27, 2006.
  14. Evidence of this can be found in the Israeli economy, which managed to maintain relative stability during the war. Eighty-five percent of industrial plants in the north remained fully or partially operational, and about three quarters of their employees attended work every day. See the editorial in *Haaretz* from August 9, 2006. Additional evidence can be found in the figures relating to the level of faith of Israeli consumers in August 2006 published in *Globes*, which determined that the confidence index rose three points (to 83 points) in August after a one point drop in July and a two point rise in June. The increase was mostly generated by continued improvement in the assessment of the economy and an evaluation of the situation of the individual for the following six months.
  15. There was a prominent attitude that peripheral sections of society contribute to national security, while "the Tel Aviv bubble" relieves itself of rallying round for the good of the country. See, for example, the remark by Maj. Gen. Elazar Stern, head of IDF Human Resources, on Galei Tzahal radio and quoted by *Globes* on August 16, 2006: "I make condolence visits mainly to kibbutzim and Jewish settlements in the territories. I don't get to Tel Aviv much...there has been no bereavement there and there won't be...one should commend immigrants from the former Soviet republics and Ethiopia, who make up a higher proportion of the bereaved families." This aroused a wave of response in the media that dwelled much on what it termed as the grudge and suspicion felt by residents of the outlying areas of the country towards the complacent residents of Tel Aviv. See also the *Maariv* weekend magazine, August 11, 2006, and Avirama Golan in *Haaretz*, August 23, 2006.
  16. See a survey conducted by the Mada al-Carmel – Arab Center for Applied Social Research, one week after the ceasefire began. The main findings of the survey, published in a number of publications including the Ynet website on August 29, 2006, indicated that: 32 percent of the Arab population of Israel believed that Israel was responsible for the outbreak of war, 75 percent felt that the IDF's operations in Lebanon were akin to war crimes, 52 percent thought that Israel mainly tried to achieve American objectives in the war, 32 percent claimed that the war caused a deterioration in relations between Arabs and Jews, two thirds expressed the feeling that the country did not help Arab citizens in the north as much as Jews, and 69 percent thought that the reason for the high number of Arab fatalities (one third of the total) was due the shortage of bomb shelters in Arab towns. Another survey conducted by the Dahaf Institute for the Knesset television channel (*Maariv*, August 25, 2006) revealed that 27 percent of Arab interviewees replied that they supported Israel during

- the war and wanted it to win, 36 percent did not support either side, and 18 percent said they supported Hizbollah.
17. Initial report issued by the subcommittee investigating the readiness of the home front for emergency situations for the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, September 12, 2006. The subcommittee, headed by MK Ami Ayalon, defined the government's handling of the home front as "leadership failure." See also the series of articles by Ruti Sinai and others in *Haaretz* on the role of the home front in the Second Lebanon War; an article by Daniel Ben Simon, "Betrayal of the State," *Haaretz* September 4, 2006, and remarks associated with the head of the GSS (*Haaretz*, August 24, 2006, based on Channel 2), according to which "during the war the government systems collapsed completely...the north was clearly abandoned." In an extensive Maagar Mohot survey, conducted among residents of northern Israel and published in *Haaretz* on September 12, 2006, Israelis gave the government's performance a rating of 2.1 on a scale of 1-5. For the government actions during the war see the government services and information portal at [www.gov.il](http://www.gov.il), in the file "Returning to Routine."
  18. Law Book 71, March 1951. The law that established the Civilian Defense System defined a long list of responsibilities in times of war and stipulated that it would be under the aegis of the minister of defense.
  19. The Israel Emergency Economy is an inter-ministerial body established by the Israeli government in 1955 and is responsible for the preparation of essential elements of the economy in emergency situations in order to avoid, as far as possible, disruptions and damage to the civilian economy in wartime and to allow civilian populations to maintain as normal a lifestyle as possible. The Israel Emergency Economy does not handle matters relating to civilian defense – bomb shelters, protective kits, rescue operations and guidelines on how to behave during emergency situations – topics that are under the aegis of the Home Front Command. The Israel Emergency Economy was not activated during the Second Lebanon War, "as the government decided to establish a command and control entity, under the director general of the prime minister's office, and there is no need for duplication." This was conveyed from the defense minister's office to the subcommittee of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, which examined the issue of the readiness of the home front during the war. See [www.nfc.co.il](http://www.nfc.co.il), from August 24, 2006.
  20. As background to examining this issue see Nahum Ben Elia, "The Fourth Generation: New Local Government in Israel," Floersheimer Institute for Policy Studies, 2004. Much was written in the daily media on the conduct of some local authorities during the war. The criticism of the minister of the interior, who is responsible for local government, was particularly fierce. He claimed in the Knesset's Interior Committee: "I discovered serious flaws in certain towns...I was told that many of the municipal management – the elected figures and also the executive officers – had fled," *Haaretz*, August 29, 2006. In Safed, seven out of 350 municipal workers stayed to do their jobs.



21. On the IDF investigation into the Home Front Command, see *Haaretz*, October 3, 2006. The main flaw that emerged: despite the drills, the Command did not foresee the vacuum that formed because of the weakness of the authorities in the north. There are 107 authorities in the area that sustained damage; most worked well but some almost did not operate at all. In Safed a problem was identified and the Command sent hundreds of soldiers to distribute food to bomb shelters.
22. See, for example, Avi Bitzor, "The Civilian Home Front as a Crucial Front," Omedia website, August 2006; Yossi Melman, *Haaretz*, August 24, 2006.
23. The northern precinct of the Israeli police was particularly effective in its activities. See, for example, Ofer Petersburg, *Yediot Ahronot*, August 11, 2006.
24. The head of the Doctrine and Development department of the Home Front Command was quoted in *Haaretz* on August 11, 2006 as saying that the actual rocket attacks did not surprise the army but they did not foresee people sitting in bomb shelters for a month. "We had long-term plans, but we did not consider such a long time."
25. Chief of Staff Dan Halutz said in an interview to *Yediot Ahronot* on October 1, 2006, that: "that evening (July 12) we did not yet know we were embarking on a war with Hizbollah."
26. With regard to evacuation of towns in emergency situations, there is government decision 985 from November 11, 2001, that determines, inter alia, that "the Israeli government is authorized to declare 'evacuation time' and thereby issue a directive ordering the evacuation of residents (up to 25,000) and take them to absorption facilities... evacuation of more than 25,000 residents requires a declaration by the government of 'an emergency situation' or 'total war.'"
27. The state comptroller's report, September 2001, no. 52a, on the preparedness of settlements in the north following the IDF's withdrawal from Lebanon.
28. Dan Meridor, who headed the committee charged in 2006 with formulating a defense concept for Israel, was quoted in *Maariv* on August 31, 2006, as saying: "The last war was a new type of war. A new cornerstone needs to be established, in addition to the components of deterrence, early warning, and victory. We must... take care of defense of the home front." He was also quoted in an interview with *Haaretz*, on October 3, 2006: "There is the security triad comprising deterrence (how to prevent war), warning (how to know, in time, that war will break out), and decision (how to win the war). In the new era, the triad becomes a tetrad, because it is augmented by the aspect of civil defense. This is a campaign that the army is not conducting."