Assuming that Operation Roaring Lion does not end in the complete defeat of Hezbollah, the issue of disarming Hezbollah will remain on the agenda at its conclusion—an interest shared by both Israel and the Lebanese state. This article proposes adopting the DDR model—Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration—and advancing an L(ebanon)DDR process as an orderly framework for disarming Hezbollah and integrating it into Lebanon, alongside repairing, rebuilding, and strengthening the Lebanese state. This framework offers an alternative to disarming Hezbollah through military force, which would require Israel to occupy all of Lebanon. Although it is clear that Hezbollah will not relinquish its weapons easily, the current circumstances present an opportunity to force this outcome through combined Lebanese–Israeli, regional, and international efforts. These circumstances include the willingness of Israel and Lebanon to enter into direct political negotiations; the military weakening of Hezbollah (and Iran) following the war; the IDF’s presence in southern Lebanon; and the growing support within Lebanon for disarming Hezbollah. On April 9, Israel agreed to President Aoun’s proposal to open direct negotiations with Lebanon to promote a peace arrangement and disarm Hezbollah. This objective is the central challenge on the path to an agreement between the two states, which would establish the Lebanese government’s monopoly over the use of military force. Experience from DDR processes suggests that this model can help, as it offers a long-term, supervised, and gradual process that combines disarmament with civil, social, and economic rehabilitation, alongside international support and reciprocal incentives for all parties involved.

Blockade, agreement, or escalation: Where is the US–Iran negotiation crisis headed?

How did antisemitic narratives enter the public discourse in the United States during Operation Roaring Lion, and how should Israel respond?

Although we are currently in the midst of a war and do not yet know how it will end, the US negotiations initiative—which may bring the campaign to an end—requires a clear definition of Israel’s interest regarding the Iranian nuclear project. The conclusion of Operation Roaring Lion will place Israel and the international community before a new strategic reality vis-à-vis Iran. The regime in Tehran, if it survives the war, may—after experiencing systemic trauma and damage to its senior leadership—adopt a national security doctrine that relies on nuclear weapons as its sole existential deterrent capability. Under these circumstances, it is essential to ensure that Iran retains no nuclear capability that could serve as a foundation for a military nuclear program. This paper argues that previous models of “risk management” (such as the JCPOA, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) are no longer relevant. Therefore, Israel must insist on the complete dismantling of Iran’s uranium enrichment infrastructure and relevant technological capabilities as a necessary condition for ending the war, whether by diplomatic or military means.